Abortion:

Michael Dorf has another good article on FindLaw today. The jist is this: we ought not cloud the debates on fetus status, and whether a crime should carry harsher penalties where a fetus is destroyed with the abortion debate.
Here are some tidbits:
"In my judgment, the pro-choice movement ought actually to support strict laws against feticide. The whole point of an abortion right, after all, is that a pregnant woman--not the state or anyone else--decides whether to have an abortion. A woman who plans to give birth, but is attacked by someone who kills her fetus in the process, is violently deprived of the right to choose not to have an abortion.
Certainly pro-choice activists would oppose government-mandated sterilization. For similar reasons, they should support punishing feticide.
...
There are two satisfactory answers to the worry that supporting anti-feticide laws undermines Roe.
First, laws treating feticide as murder do not need to define fetuses as persons. California's law is illustrative. It defines murder as the killing of a human being or a fetus.
Second, there is nothing especially troubling about permitting the law to define the word "person" differently for different purposes. Statutes routinely define various words, including "person," so that they will mean exactly what the legislature intends in a particular context."

There's much more, so follow the link to read the entirety.
I'm glad that Dorf offers to both sides the notion that a fetus might carry different meanings in different circumstances. However, such argument, I'm guessing, will only carry weight with those that do indeed think that a fetus can mean different things...other than a living person status.
Through my worldview, this is the case- a fetus is not yet a living human until some unknown point during pregnancy. (As an agnogstic on the meaning of life, the "unknown point" is up for debate.) But for most anti-abortion folks, there's no such question on the status of a fetus- and thus this argument can't morally be appreciated; in that, if life begins with conception, there is no room for a definition other than murder. (I hope to get feedback, though, on whether Dorf's legal argument can be appreciated form this perspective.)