I was wrong about Sanctions
Upon reading a Feb. 8 Editorial from the Times, "A Success Worth Noting in Iraq", I remembered that sometime about two years ago, I argued against the Iraq sanctions.
Now, I believe this was before serious talk about whether or not Iraq posed a military threat to the U.S.- but I remember having a discussion where I argued that sanctions where in fact hurting the people of Iraq. The context was a Cuba discussion- and the pretty well-known argument that our embargo is hurting the people there. Same with Iraq. And as with some's argument on Cuba, I argued that sanctions may in fact be prohibiting a revolution twoards liberal democracy.
Well, as far as the Iraq side of that argument goies, I need to revisit it. The Times editorial makes a good point: it looks like sanctions were exceedingly effective in preventing a known-enemy, Mr. Hussein, from making good on his known desire to promulgate a weapons program.

In response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait and its defeat the next year by an American-led military coalition, the United Nations Security Council imposed oil export restrictions, a ban on the import of weapons and potential weapons ingredients, and a series of disarmament requirements to be monitored by aggressive international inspections.

None of the measures worked exactly as intended. All were met with Iraqi deceptions and resistance. Oil export sanctions were evaded with increasing success. United Nations inspectors were repeatedly obstructed and often felt threatened. They were withdrawn in advance of American bombing strikes in 1998, and not permitted to return until 2002. Yet the totality of these measures, particularly the prohibitions on importing weapons and their ingredients, now appears to have worked surprisingly well, apparently persuading Mr. Hussein that he would never be able to rebuild his weapons programs so long as sanctions remained in effect. That was exactly the message Washington wanted to send.
...
The case of Libya also illustrates the effectiveness of sanctions. Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi's renunciation of his weapons programs was not simply — perhaps not even principally — a reaction to the American invasion of Iraq. It came in response to years of painful economic pressure through sanctions, along with diplomatic assurances that changed Libyan behavior could bring relief. President Bush emphasized this point after Libya announced its decision, telling other pariah countries that they too could rejoin the world economy and international community if they gave up their unconventional weapons programs. Clearly spelling out the steps needed to win relief from sanctions can motivate at least some countries to change their offending behavior.

Sanctions are hardly a perfect tool. They hurt innocent civilians, require broad international enforcement and work best when backed up by effective inspection arrangements. But under the right conditions, they offer American administrations an effective alternative to military force, which, it is now clearer than ever, should be employed only as a last resort.